Introduction
* Commodity stockpiling is currently the subject of serious policy discussion. In the aftermath of the OPEC oil embargo, it has been proposed that the United States develop reserves to protect against future supply disruptions.' Recognizing that cartels are also being considered by countries producing commodities, such as coffee and bauxite, for which imports comprise a substantially greater proportion of U.S. consumption than they do for oil, Congress has created a National Commission on Supplies and Shortages. This analysis examines stockpiling as a strategy that a consuming nation might employ to suppress future prices.2 Stockpiling has been employed in the past as a policy instrument, though not primarily to influence prices. Since the Second World
The Energy Policy Act of 1975 sets a target oil reserve of one billion barrels, of which one-half is to be purchased by the end of 1982. Recently, authorization has been requested to spend $871 million for building storage facilities, purchasing oil, and conducting further studies (Cowan, 1976) .
2 Special cases of price suppression include actions that reduce the probability of an embargo (what is in effect an infinite import price), or discourage monopolistic behavior by extant or potential cartels. Bergsten (1973) , discussing the threat of OPEC-type pricing actions by Third World producers, notes that in addition to oil, cartels exist in bananas, bauxite, coffee, copper, iron ore, mercury, phosphates, and tin.
consider the case of depletable resources. The results there vary significantly from those obtained in the text, which is concerned with nondepletable resources entirely.
We shall find that in most circumstances the consuming nation benefits substantially from the pursuit of a stockpiling strategy designed to influence the actions of the producers. At the expense of increased early-period purchases, and the interest costs thereon, it will be able to induce substantial reductions in later-period prices. Stockpiling can also generate a strong positive efficiency effect by giving increased early profits to the producer-something akin to a lump-sum payment-in return for future prices that are closer to marginal cost. Although gains to the consuming nation outweigh those to the cartel in most of the models we consider, the producer must always benefit from the consuming nation's ability to stockpile.
(Surprisingly, the consumer need not, as two later examples will show.) Costs of production and storage, the discount rates of the producer and consumer, and the length of the time horizon are the parameters that determine the magnitudes of the gains to the two parties.
O The role of government in stockpiling. Why might the government consider playing a role in stockpiling? Why not rely on speculators? The great risks inherent in such speculation, particularly if economies of scale make small stockpiles infeasible, might deter private parties from stockpiling sufficiently. Moreover, speculators might anticipate that the government would adopt penalizing strategies, such as excess profits taxes or price controls, should any of the situations develop where speculators would otherwise make great profits. A somewhat different argument, frequently overlooked, would suggest that if the government stockpiles a commodity subject to substantial supply and hence price fluctuations, risk-averse producers will be induced to direct efficient levels of resources to these commodities. Arguments of this sort provide the only justifications for government stockpiles in areas such as grains, where the avowed objective is to smooth out price fluctuations.
We shall be concerned with a quite different consideration that is central when there is a cartel or monopoly on the production side. Some form of governmental strategy may help to influence prices, or the probabilities of events such as embargoes that will affect prices, in a manner that favors the nation's consumers. No consumer would be willing to alter his purchases on an individual basis, because he would receive only a small portion of the benefits should prices be influenced in a favorable direction. In fact, in most of the models considered, the socially optimal strategy requires that the stockpiler buy high and sell low, hardly an inducement to private stockpiling. O Basic assumptions. To keep the analysis manageable, we make critical simplifying assumptions in three areas: valuation, production and stockpiling costs, and permissible strategies. We do not believe that the qualitative nature of our results would be changed significantly if any of these asssumptions were elaborated to correspond more closely to a detailed reality.
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The cartel is assumed to maximize its discounted revenues net of 68/ OF ECONOMICS production costs, i.e., producer's surplus. For our initial models, production costs of the commodity in question are assumed to be constant, perhaps zero. (In Appendix 2 we consider cases where there is a constraint on the total amount of the resource produced.) The objective of the consuming nation is to maximize the present value of what we shall refer to as net consumers' surplus. It consists of consumers' surplus, as ordinarily defined, less the costs associated with the stockpile. The stockpile costs are purchase costs plus costs of storage, less resale receipts. Following the analyses of Kalymon (1975) and Kennedy (1974) , aggregate demand curves of a consuming nation are linear; they have the same form in each of the periods of the analysis.6
The government of a consuming nation cannot intervene in the market directly to regulate its citizens' consumption demands. The only policy option available is to stockpile. Storage costs are constant per unit of stockpile; in most cases they are zero.
All transactions between producers and consumers are at arm's length; they are conducted through the market. No side deals between the cartel and consumer(s) are possible; nor can there be any form of package deal involving a lump-sum payment and a lowered marginal price-an arrangement that would achieve increased efficiency through a degree of price discrimination. * In the basic situation of this analysis, a single producer or a 2. Models with perfectly cohesive cartel of producers sets the price in each period, unified consumer but permits consumers and the stockpiling government to purchase stockpiling whatever quantities they desire at the price fixed for that period, p,. In each period, consumption, C,, is determined by the linear demand curve Ct=K-apt.
(1)
The simplest case in which stockpiling can be analyzed is a twoperiod model with a single consuming nation, and with production and storage both costless activities. Although a two-period time horizon is obviously too short for a full evaluation of stockpiling strategies, it yields insights into the processes by which the model operates, and has the added virtue of analytic tractability. Beyond two periods, a strictly analytic approach quickly becomes unwieldy, even with linear demand curves. We developed a computer algorithm to solve the many-period version of the model; most of the results presented are based on a ten-period horizon. Appendix 1 deals with an infinite time horizon.
Our models assume that the players engage in self-interested maximizing behavior. There are no institutional arrangements external to the models through which they can threaten or promise each other, or in some other way forgo their noncooperative strategies. Despite the fact that both players follow their noncooperative strate-gies, we shall see that stockpiling allows for significant efficiency gains over the period-by-period monopolistic outcome. O A two-period model. We assume that the consuming nation enters the first period with no stockpile, and that any stockpile acquired in that period is released in the second. In the first period the cartel sets a fixed price, Pi, at which it will sell whatever quantities are demanded. Consumers in the importing nation will then demand C1 units for current consumption, as defined by equation (1). The government in the importing nation may choose to purchase units of the commodity, the level of the stockpile being denoted S. Thus the total amount demanded from the cartel in period 1 will be:
In period 2, the process is repeated, with the cartel setting P2 and consumers demanding C2 units, again in accordance with equation (1). However, the importing nation will also release its stockpile, so the total amount demanded from the cartel in period 2 will be D2 = C2 -S.
The goal of the cartel is to maximize the present value of its profits in the two periods. With marginal costs of production at 0, the objective of the cartel in effect is to maximize discounted revenue:7 Y = YI + f3,Y2
where A, = 1/(1 +rp) is the cartel's one-period discount factor, and rp is its discount rate. The total value, V, rieaped by the consuming nation has two components: (1) the consumers' surplus its citizens derive and (2) the government's revenues, net of purchase costs. The second component is expected to be negative, but must be more than offset by the gain in consumers' surplus. We aggregate these two components on a period-by-period basis to get net consumers' surplus. This sum in period 1 will be V1 = 2 -piS,
where the first term is consumers' surplus, the conventional triangle under the demand curve but above the price line, and the second term is the government's first-period loss due to purchasing a stockpile. Net consumers' surplus in the second period will be V2 = 2 a -P2)C2 + P2S,
7 Alternative versions of all of the models presented in this paper have been developed using positive marginal costs of both production and storage. The results, only illustrative examples of which are presented in this paper, are relatively insensitive to variations in the level of production costs and storage costs, for most commodities are very small relative to monopoly prices. The U.S. Federal Energy Administration (1974), for example, estimates oil storage costs at about $1 per barrel capital costs (if salt domes are used) and less than $0.01 per barrel annual charges. In an analysis of policies with regard to aluminum, chromium, platinum, and palladium, the U.S. Department of the Interior (1975) found the storage costs of those materials to be low enough to justify exclusion from their calculations.
where the first term has the same interpretation as before, and the second term represents the government's revenues when it supplies S units of demand from the stockpile.
The two-period objective function of the consuming nation can then be written
where ,3A = 11(1+r,) is the consuming nation's one-period discount factor. The cartel's and consuming nation's value functions are shown geometrically in Figure 1. Figure la illustrates the case where no stockpiling is carried out. The area of triangle w represents consumers' surplus, while the area of rectangle y is producers' surplus. The area of triangle x is the net loss in total surplus due to monopoly pricing; the Pareto optimum, given zero marginal cost, would call for consumption of K units and some allocation of the total area under the demand curve between producers and consumers. In the absence of stockpiling, the results in periods 1 and 2 will be identical. Note that the areas of triangles w and x are equal, and that their sum is equal to the area of y. Thus, the efficiency loss without stockpiling is equal to consumers' surplus, or to one-half of the cartel's revenues. Setting the derivative of Y2(p2,S) with respect to P2 equal to zero yields the optimal P2 as a function of S:
8 This model has some of the features of bilateral monopoly situations where the seller sets the price in each period and the buyer then chooses how much to purchase. In those cases, the monopsonist secures no return for his market power, barring some credible external means by which he can commit himself to respond other than by choosing his welfare-maximizing quantity, given the price set. There is a substantial literature on the nature of "solutions" when this game is played many times, but all of them break down if the players are unable to commit themselves to strategies. In the final period there will be no incentive for the buyer to cooperate; working backwards, each successive period then becomes the last one so far as cooperation is concerned.
This formulation has an analogue to traditional von Stackelberg leader-follower models in oligopoly. In his price choice for the last period, the producer acts as the leader, selecting the optimal price given the known reaction of the buyer (as given by his demand curve and stockpile level). This behavior by the producer is taken as the given reaction curve when the consuming nation decides how much to stockpile in the second to last period. The pair of equilibrium strategies then represents a process of alternating leadership to optimize against the other participant's predictable response. In contrast to oligopoly models, leadership here is dictated by timing, not tradition or any calculation of strategic advantage. Substituting this expression into equations (9) and (10), we obtain P2 and C2 in terms of Pl, which we denote as P**2(P1) and C**2(Pl), respectively.
The final step in the solution process takes us back to the first decision, the cartel's selection of P, to maximize discounted profits: There the cartel will charge the same price in both periods, p, = P2= 2 K = pm, the one-period monopoly price. both eriod, Pi2a The level of consumption is then the same in each period, as are the level of demand, the cartel's revenues, and consumers' surplus.
In the absence of data on the parameters of the demand curve, K and a, it would be meaningless to present absolute figures comparing the two cases. It can be shown, however, that for both cases the prices will be proportional to K, producers' and consumers' surpluses will be proportional to K, and, in the stockpiling case,. the optimal stocka pile level will be proportional to K.9 Thus, the effects of stockpiling can be assessed on a percentage basis independent of the values of either K or a. If, for example, the discount rates are 0.05 for both the cartel and the consuming nation (r, = r1, = 0.05), then the following results are observed: The first-period price, PI, is 3.4 percent higher than the one-period monopoly price and the second-period price is 27.6 percent lower. The optimal stockpile level is substantial, 27.6 percent of K, the amount demanded for consumption at a price of 0. The present value of net consumers' surplus in the two periods rises by 7.7 percent, and the cartel's revenues also rise, by 6.0 percent. Almost 20 percent of the original deadweight loss, shown as triangle x in Figure la, is eliminated. In all cases, the proportional gain in efficiency will be equal to the gain in net consumers' surplus plus twice the gain in cartel revenues.'0 Thus, stockpiling aids both consumers and the cartel.
The producer must always gain if the consuming nation stockpiles at all, as becomes obvious upon reflection. A possible strategy for the producer is to charge the monopoly price in each period. Whatever strategy the government of the consuming nation chooses in response, its citizen consumers will be consuming the monopoly amount in each period. The producer, the only source of supply, cannot be held below the discounted sum of his monopoly profits. Should the consuming nation stockpile, at the very least the producer would be getting some of his profits sooner. If he went further and changed his pricing policy, that would imply that he was doing better still. in that manner back to the first decision, the cartel's choice of the optimal initial price, Pi* Though intractable analytically, this model can be solved for specific parameter values using the computer.1 1 We focus on the time paths of price and stockpile level, and the distribution of the gains from stockpiling. Fortunately, the results exhibit the same proportionality observed in the two-period case. Thus, as before, the effects 10 The relationship holds only when the cartel and the consuming nation employ a common discount rate. When the discount rates differ, an indexing problem arises; the gain in efficiency will depend on which discount rate is applied.
" We wish to thank Surender Gulati for developing and programming the algorithm used to solve the many-period model. of stockpiling can be assessed on a percentage basis, independent of the value of either K or a.
The effects of lengthening the time horizon are shown in Figure 3 , which plots improvements over the monopoly price, no-stockpiling case, for r, = s1) = 0.05. The gain in consumers' surplus is substantial as the number of periods increases, rising from 7.7 percent in the two-period case to 48.5 percent with a twenty-period model. The improvement in cartel profits rises from 6.0 percent with a two-period horizon to a peak of 16.8 percent with a twelve-period model, and then falls, reaching 13.9 percent at twenty periods. The gain in total efficiency, measured as the reduction in deadweight loss, increases from 19.6 to 76.2 percent. As the time horizon stretches to infinity, as in the model of Appendix 1, the reduction in deadweight loss reaches 83 percent. As might have been expected, the two-period model, given its limited time for stockpiling, understates the possible value of stockpiling strategies, which are likely to extend over a considerable number of years. additional units for-the stockpile diminishes. Thus, in the earlier periods, when the stockpile is being accumulated, the optimal cartel strategy calls for-setting a price that varies inversely with the consumers' discount rate. The price is not lowered enoLugh, however, to make the consuming nation stockpile as much as it would at lower discount rates. Thus, during the later periods, when the stockpile is being drawn down, the consuming nation with a higher discount rate has fewer stockpiled units to release to drive down prices. The present values of consumers' and producer's surpluses in a ten-period model are plotted as functions of the discount rate in Figure 6 . The improvement in net consumers' surplus over the nostockpiling case rises rapidly with the discount rate; gains for cartel profits fall.
The gains from stockpiling, moreover, will be affected by discount rate differences between producing and consuming nations. How might this divergence affect the gains from stockpiling? Stockpiling causes the consuming nation to take losses in the early periods, when the stockpile is being acquired, in order to achieve a higher level of consumer-s' surplus later. For the producers, the situation is reversed; the stockpile's acquisition drives up revenues in the early periods, but its release lowers income in the future. Thus, intuition suggests that assume that both the consuming nation and the cartel employ a discount rate of 0.05.
Using the parameter values assumed above, the gain to the consuming nation from stockpiling is 22.7 percent, down only slightly from 23.0 percent when production and storage costs are zero. For the cartel, the gains from the consumer's stockpiling are 12.3 percent, as opposed to 12.5 percent before. In every period, the stockpile level with positive production and storage costs is lower than before; its peak level is roughly two-thirds as large. The relationship between consumers' and producer's surpluses and the number of consuming nations is shown in Figure 9b . The cartel's revenues fakR steadily throughout. The level of consumers' surplus follows a more complicated path, rising from N = 1 to N = 2, and then falling steadily, until N = N+, when the cartel abandons efforts to induce stockpiling and reverts to the one-period monopoly price. The intuitive explanation for this result is straightforward. Two conflicting forces are at work. As the number of consuming nations increases, the total level of the stockpile for any given first-period price becomes increasingly smaller and suboptimal. Yet, at the same time, the cartel's optimal first-period price also declines-a factor working to the benefit of consumers. In a very real sense, the "weakness" of the consuming nations in the case N = 2 is a virtue; it forces the cartel to lower its first-period price to induce stockpiling. O A partial alliance of consuming nations. Even with many consuming nations, some coordination of stockpiling efforts could be achieved through multilateral arrangements or alliances. Consider a situation where some but not all consuming nations form an alliance to manage their stockpiles, which in effect become a joint stockpile, for the benefit of their citizens. Alliance members account for the fraction 6 of total demand. Each nonmember is assumed to be so small that it will never stockpile, though its citizens will certainly benefit from the alliance's stockpiling efforts. The solution techniques applied earlier It should be stressed that the smaller consuming nation's higher level of consumers' surplus does not presuppose that it exploits the larger country in any way. These are the natural results from a follower-follower model. They are a special case of a more general proposition in the economic theory of alliances: larger countries are likely to provide a disproportionately large share of public or semipublic goods (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966) .
Models with two
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O Two consuming nations of unequal size: leader-follower case. One stockpiling nation may act as a leader, recognizing the effect its own stockpile has on the other's behavior. It may be able to assume this role because it can commit itself to a stockpile level before the other consuming nation can act, or simply because it alone recognizes and chooses to exploit the interaction between the amounts that, the two stockpile. We assess this case not only because we suspect it may possess empirical validity in particular circumstances, but also because it leads to interesting general insights into strategic situations.
Intuitively, one might expect a nation to benefit from assuming a leadership role. For any given first-period price, a consuming nation's surplus will increase if it becomes the leader. The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that the cartel need not follow the same pricing strategy in the leader-follower and follower-follower cases. As we shall show below, in many cases a consuming nation is actually made worse off by assuming a leadership role.
Let X be the market share of the leader. The follower's reaction function will, as before, be a function of the first-period price and the stockpile held by the leader. The task of the leader-nation is to select its stockpile level to maximize the consumers' surplus of its own citizens, given the reaction function of the follower. The cartel's optimal second-period price will, as before, depend only on the total stockpile held by both nations. Solving the leader's maximization problem yields a three-part strategy: In other words, if pi is high enough relative to the leader's share of the market, the leader will not stockpile at all. If pi is low enough, again relative to X, the second expression above applies, and the optimal strategy for the leader is to stockpile a positive amount, but not enough to eliminate stockpiling by the follower-nation. Finally, if pi is greater than some critical value of pl, which is a function of X and is written above as pl+(X), the optimal strategy for the leader is to make its stockpile large enough to suppress all stockpiling by the THE BELL JOURNAL follower. As X, the leader's share of the market, increases, the price 84/ OF ECONOMICS necessary to induce this shift declines; i.e., dp1+(X)/dXA < 0.
The total stockpile is the leader's stockpile, a function of Pi' plus the follower's stockpile, a function of both P, and the leader's stockpile selection. Corresponding to the conditions of the leader's three-part strategy, respectively, as X increases, first only the follower stockpiles, then both leader and follower stockpile, and finally only the leader stockpiles.
There are four possibilities for the cartel's optimal strategy. If the leader controls a relatively small share of the market, the alliance model pertains, and the cartel's optimal strategy is to charge the alliance price, where 1-A = 6. When the leader has a somewhat larger share of the market, a lower price that induces stockpiling by both the leader and the follower is optimal. Then, as X increases over a range, the cartel should raise its first-period price to p1+(X), the minimum price needed to make the leader stockpile sufficiently to drive out stockpiling by the follower. Finally, when the leader is large enough, the alliance price for X = 8 is higher than p1+(X). The cartel should shift once again to its alliance pricing strategy, only this time the leader is the stockpiler. The four critical ranges of market-shares are indicated as A, B, C, and D in Figure 12a , which plots the optimal leader's market share.
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As noted earlier, it is not always advantageous to a consuming nation to assume the role of leader. Consumers' surpluses for both the leader and follower nations and the cartel's profits are graphed in Figure 12b . Only over the narrow range where both leader and follower stockpile, B, does the leader nation achieve a higher level of consumers' surplus than it would in the follower-follower case with the same share of the market. The welfare of its citizens is actually lower over some of A and all of C; at some points it falls below the level that would be achieved if no stockpiling were possible. For the follower-nation and the cartel, the results are no better than in the follower-follower case for all values of X, and are worse for part of A and all of B and C.
The results in the leader-follower model at first appear counterintuitive: it would seem that a nation's position ought to improve if it recognizes the full impact of its actions and acts accordingly. The difficulty, however, is that if the cartel is aware of the leader's role, it must follow the pricing strategy shown in Figure 12a in order to avoid exploitation by the leader nation. Thus, over the range 1 -61 -X < &-it must charge a higher price in the leader-follower situation than it would if both consuming nations acted as followers. Thinking of this as the traditional Cournot leader-follower duopoly model overlooks the strategic role played by the third party involved, the cartel. Here, in contrast to the duopoly model, leadership can prove detrimental.'3
The leader-follower model and the other models considered in this section illustrate the wide range of outcomes possible when stockpiling is available in a world with two or more consuming nations. Stockpiling is a public good for the consuming nations; as traditional theory would predict, private provision results in a suboptimal level of stockpile. However, some surprising results arise from the nature of the interaction of these potential stockpilers with the cartel. No longer do we find the passive marketplace of classic models of oligopoly or public goods provision. Instead, the cartel plays an active role, setting prices that take account of the strategies the consuming nations will employ. As a consequence, consuming nations may benefit from disunity, and be hurt by their capability to assume leadership roles.
4. Alternative * Our preceding analyses assume a simple form of interaction in the models of strategic market. In each period, the producer specifies a price; the governinteraction ment(s) of the consuming nation(s) purchases or releases a quantitythe net change in its stockpile. More elaborate strategies could be considered. Producers might, for example, offer price-quantity schedules rather than mere prices.14 Either side might make commitments, 13 Schelling (1963, p. 37) describes the complement of this result, where "weakness" improves a player's position: "When a person-or a country-has lost the power to help himself, or the power to avert mutual damage, the other interested party has no choice but to assume the cost or responsibility."
14 If price-quantity schedules were possible, the cartel could extract all consumers' surplus by quoting as the total price for each quantity the area under the demand curve to that point.
If the producer were a single nation, we would be much more likely to observe such schedules. The need to coordinate the various members of a cartel and to avoid issues that could lead to its breakdown, however, makes it much more likely that either explicitly, perhaps by a threat or a promise, or tacitly, for  example through the choice of a nondominant strategy in a multiplay game.
The richness of available models is limited only by the imaginative capabilities of the players on the two sides of the market, and the possibilities for institutional arrangements in the real world. To illustrate, we consider four classes of models: (1) side payments are possible, (2) full cooperation is possible, but no side payments, (3) the producer has the ability to make binding commitments, and (4) the consuming nation has the ability to make binding commitments. For each we consider a numerical example in the two-period context.
If side payments between the two players were available, full efficiency could be achieved. In return for a lump-sum payment, the producer would set the price each period equal to the marginal cost of production, zero.
A full-cooperation-no-side-payments model would make the stockpile level and price in each period control variables. The objective would be to achieve an efficient outcome, one that maximizes discounted benefits to the producer, Y, given any level of discounted benefits to the consumer, V. Different values of the control variables would correspond to each particular V.
The If the producer can make a binding commitment, he should combine a threat with a promise. His maximal threat is to withhold all goods from the market in the second period-i.e., to set a price of infinity-unless the consumer engages in a particular mode of stockpiling behavior. In formulating his strategy, the producer is subject to the binding constraint that the consuming nation be no worse off stockpiling the demanded amount than it would be if it responded optimally to the threatened pricing strategy, (po,o). The role of the producer's promise is to improve the consumer's payoff should he comply. The optimal package for the producer employs both his maximal threat and his maximal promise. He sets Pi = (K/a)[2,3/(1+2,3)], and demands that the consumer purchase a stockpile, S = K[2,3/(1+2,3)]-E, where p is the common discount factor, and E is an arbitrarily small quantity designed to tip the consumer to comply. The producer promises to set P2 = 0 if the consumer complies; otherwise he will set it at oo. The outcome if this strategy is complied with is at point P. Note that when the producer has the market offers will be expressed solely in terms of price, as they are for the most part with OPEC.
1" We could set p, arbitrarily close to 0, make S exceedingly large, and in effect achieve a system with lump-sum side payments. To avoid this anomaly, which arises only in the case of zero production and storage costs, we constrain S to be no larger than K, the amount demanded in the second period if P2 = 0 . always realize economic benefits from this activity, which suggests that stockpiling should be viewed as a mutually beneficial economic policy instrument, and not solely as a weapon for the consuming nations.17 The gains to the two participants depend on the length of the time horizon, the discount rates for the cartel and the consuming nation, and the costs of production and storage. Section 2 of this paper explored the roles of these factors through a series of sensitivity analyses. Under most circumstances, the longer the time horizon, the lower the consumer discount rate, the higher the cartel discount rate, and the lower production and storage costs, the greater the benefits to the consuming nation (measured in relation to consumers' surplus in the absence of stockpiling).
Section 3 assessed stockpiling in a variety of strategic situations where there are two or more consuming nations. In the absence of a united alliance, as would be expected, the incentives for stockpiling are for the most part diminished. Less obvious are the results regarding the patterns of payoffs and the rapid shifts in the cartel's and the consuming nations' optimal strategies as the relationships among consuming nations change. The models in Section 4 incorporate the possibility of commitment strategies on the part of cartel or consuming nation, and of cooperative outcomes. Appendix 1 presents our basic model when the time horizon is infinite. Appendix 2 examines the implications of a finite supply for the stockpiled commodity.
A wide range of important models remains to be explored. Models incorporating various types of strategic interaction among producers merit particular attention. One such class of models has been explored implicitly already. Even if there is less than perfect unity among producers, the results of this paper apply immediately if there is a price leader, if market shares are independent of price, and if marginal costs of production are equal across all producers for any level of total output.
Extensive empirical studies would be of immense help in guiding the formulation of strategies in any particular context. Unfortunately for economic science, though not social welfare, our recent experience with cartels, though significant, is limited. Theoretical investigations of the type presented here may be the only mechanism available to evaluate the benefits of alternative consuming nation strategies.
Stockpiling traditionally has been considered as a means of coping with supply uncertainties or as a mechanism to achieve military or political objectives. This paper examined stockpiling in a different context. Prices are determined by the cartel's strategic decisions, not by nature's uncertainties; the sole objective of stockpiling is to enhance economic welfare. Our results suggest that if only for economic benefits, consuming nations should seriously consider stockpiling as a strategy for dealing with cartels. tively supplied. The stockpiling central government exercises some degree of monopsony power through its indirect influence on its citizens' purchases. If stockpiling is to prove desirable, the competitive supply curve must increase in elasticity over some range of output. The increase in elasticity that is sufficient to warrant stockpiling depends on the demand curve and the discount rate.
" In this paper we have assumed that each nation considers only the welfare of its own citizens. In reality, governments usually attach some weight, occasionally negative but more often positive, to the welfare of citizens of other nations. The models presented here could easily be extended to such cases. each pair of equilibrium strategies, beginning at any point, there will be a unique time path of price and stockpile behavior. We have identified one constraint on possible paths; they cannot lead either player to take steps that would be outside the region defined by the maximum and minimum curves. To find the minimum stockpile level, h(p3), needed to maintain any given price, p3, multiply the expression for the minimum value of dS needed to discourage the cartel from raising its price by dp and dp integrate over the range pl" to p.
Let the consumer's strategy be of the following form: That is, if the cartel fails to lower its price to h-'(ST7l), the consuming nation, simply following its prescribed strategy, will reduce its stockpile to the minimum stockpile level corresponding to the new price, to h(p). Given the way h(p) is calculated, that reduction will at least offset any gain to the producer from raising the price. Given the consumer's strategy, it will never be optimal for the cartel to set a price in excess of h-'(S7,T). We consider the equilibrium pair where the cartel's strategy is:
In response to that pricing strategy, the consuming nation's optimal stockpile acquisition strategy will be of the form given in (A7). The values of A can be calculated by using discrete approximations and an iterative process of dynamic programming. The resulting strategies are an equilibrium pair in the sense that each is optimal against the other. The strategies differ from those derived in the finite-period models, however, in that we have permitted the consuming nation to commit itself to a contingent strategy.'9 The equilibrium price and stockpile are approached asymptotically, as shown in Figure four different expressions for S*(p,) and five for p1*; each is accompanied by rather complicated boundary conditions. The model we consider is identical to the one developed in Section 2, except for the addition of a constraint on total consumption (production):
Cl + C2 -R.
We assume r, = r, = 0.05; the common discount rate eliminates some of the possibilities for S*(pl) and pl*.
If R is sufficiently large, the resource constraint will play no role.
Let R be the minimum resource constraint which is not binding on the original solution. As intuition might suggest, if R -R, the unconstrained solution derived earlier-represented by equations (9), (12), and (14)-still applies. At the opposite extreme, for R < R+, the constraint will be so tight that no stockpiling takes place and the cartel charges the Pi that would be charged if stockpiling were unavailable. The range in between, R+ ? R < R, still has stockpiling, although the resource constraint is binding. Over that range, the critical complication is that P2 can never be lower than the price that would lead consumers to demand all of the remaining resource in the second period. This constraint is K-oQP2 -': R -C I(A10) or 2K-R-aP1 (All) a Hence there is no benefit to the consumer from stockpiling beyond the amount needed to drive P2 to this lower limit. Note that this lower limit on P2 will decrease as Pi increases. Thus, the size of the optimal stockpile actually increases over the relevant range of pl: That the consuming nation actually loses from having a stockpiling capability in this constrained-resource example is somewhat disturbing. Most of the commodities being considered for stockpiling are constrained. The levels of resources, discount rates and overall strategic situation may be such that stockpiling actually hurts. Any practical situation merits detailed study to see what types of commitments might be made to improve the outcome for one or both parties.
